Traditional competition law enforcement is dead (but not yet buried). Long live the new enforcement of competition law.
On 31 March 2026 Geradin Partners’ Amsterdam office hosted their annual webinar on key developments in Dutch competition law. During the session, @Ruben Elkerbout, @Mattijs Baneke and @Philine Wassenaar reflected on trends in public enforcement, merger control and private enforcement in 2025, and shared their expectations for the years ahead (rewatch our webinar). This blog highlights their main takeaways, also explaining the theory behind the first catchy summary phrase of the state of the union in antitrust enforcement.
Public Enforcement
As in 2024, traditional public enforcement in the Netherlands remained close to non-existent, or at least very limited in 2025. Bizarrely, the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) did not adopt any infringement decisions for anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominance, nor did it accept commitment decisions. It did, however, reject three enforcement requests. These figures underline a continued trend in public enforcement in the Netherlands: while some new investigations are initiated, formal enforcement outcomes are scarce, reflecting a more cautious and selective enforcement approach by the ACM.
- Traditional enforcement? And… it’s gone
As most in the competition law enforcement community know, traditional antitrust enforcement remains clearly deprioritised. The ACM appears to be reallocating resources towards newer areas such as digital regulation (including the Digital Services Act (DSA)), consumer protection and market investigations. At the same time, classic competition cases remain resource-intensive, requiring complex economic analysis and lengthy procedures. This has caused the ACM to (openly) question whether traditional enforcement of competition law is worth allocating its resources to. The implication of this shift entails fewer cases before Dutch courts, an increased likelihood of complaints being escalated to the European Commission, and more room for informal or negotiated outcomes between companies and the ACM. Interestingly, there appear to be little voices in Dutch society, for example by attorneys, law makers and academics, that criticize against this development. There seems to be a large consensus that the ACM is right to shift away from traditional enforcement.
- ACM’s pragmatic and flexible enforcement approach: on the spot a la carte
The ACM almost exclusively relies on informal guidance and targeted interventions rather than formal infringement decisions. This allows for quicker market impact and promotes compliance without lengthy proceedings. Examples include the ACM’s warning to pet food suppliers on resale price setting and its intervention in the textile recycling market to safeguard choice. Procedurally, this pragmatic approach is also reflected in the rejection of enforcement requests, such as complaints against Schiphol and KPN (in first instance and in objection), often citing prioritisation and capacity constraints.
- DSA enforcement takes centre stage
With its new role under the DSA, the ACM has shifted focus towards platform regulation and online safety, particularly for minors. Early enforcement has centred on compliance monitoring and cross-border coordination. Investigations include Snapchat (vaping products and minors), now taken over by the European Commission, and Roblox, where the ACM is assessing risks to underage users. These cases highlight the ACM’s growing role within the EU’s digital enforcement framework and its appetite for starting new investigations in this field.
- Courts continue to shape Dutch competition law
Dutch courts have largely upheld ACM decisions in cartel cases such as Egg producers and Cigarette producers, confirming strict enforcement of information exchanges and coordination practices. The TV producers case stands out, with the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (CBb) referring questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the scope of ‘by object’ restrictions. In abuse of dominance, the courts confirmed the ACM’s approach in both Apple (App Store conditions) and Leadiant (excessive pricing), reinforcing the ACM’s prior willingness to intervene in digital and pharmaceutical markets.
- Looking ahead: public enforcement
Looking forward, the ACM is expected to remain active in digital and labour market enforcement, including a no-poach investigation in the IT sector and an ongoing dominance investigation into a major software firm. At EU level, the ACM is contributing to a Digital Markets Act (DMA) investigation into cloud services and will participate in joint DSA actions, including on virtual currencies in gaming.
Finally, despite the clear lack of use of traditional enforcement tools, the ACM is advocating for a New Competition Tool (NCT) to address structural market issues, alongside continued reliance on market investigations, including a forthcoming market investigation into energy markets. Overall, Dutch competition enforcement is evolving: less focused on traditional cases, but increasingly proactive, strategic and embedded in the broader EU regulatory framework.
Merger control
In 2025, the ACM reviewed 147 transactions, clearing the vast majority in Phase I (i.e. more than 95%), with only a handful of proceedings moving to Phase II. Overall, the figures reflect a stable regime where most transactions can proceed without any hurdles, but with intense scrutiny and intervention in the few cases that are singled out by the ACM.
- In-depth investigations
In Zwanenberg/Unox, the ACM is assessing whether the merger reduces competition between branded and private label products, or alternatively enables foreclosure strategies through Unox’s ‘must-stock’ position. In Hal investments/VolkerWessels, concerns centre on increased concentration in construction markets, in particular fewer bidders for large infrastructure projects and strong positions in asphalt production. Both cases highlight the ACM’s focus to preserve effective competition in consumer-facing and infrastructure markets.
- Focus: mergers with wider societal impact
The ACM increasingly considers the broader societal impacts of mergers alongside traditional competition concerns. In Kyndryl/Solvinity, issues around data sovereignty and geopolitical risks were raised, but ultimately deemed outside the scope of the ACM’s review powers. The transaction was cleared, with the Dutch investment screening authority (BTI) identified as better placed to assess such risks. In contrast, DPG Media/RTL illustrates how non-price factors can apparently shape the review and outcome of cases. The ACM addressed concerns around media pluralism, opinion power and diversity of news through unexpected far-reaching commitments, including safeguards for editorial independence and free access to news content (read our prior blog and article on this topic).
- Flexible approach to merger enforcement
The ACM is showing increasing flexibility in how it addresses mergers, including intervening beyond traditional notification frameworks. The (everlasting) PostNL/Sandd saga illustrates this approach: after the courts annulled ministerial approval of a previously prohibited merger, the ACM launched a new investigation under traditional competition rules and indicated potential corrective measures to restore competition if an infringement is established. Similarly, the ACM continues to explore tools such as abuse of dominance rules and Towercast-based interventions for below-threshold acquisitions (e.g. Brink’s/Ziemann). Proposed call-in powers – expected to be introduced in early 2027 – would further expand ACM’s reach.
- Private Equity (PE) on ACM’s radar
The increasing role of private equity remains firmly on the ACM’s radar. Its “State of the Market” report shows a sharp increase in PE involvement in mergers (tripled since 2013), reflecting broader European trends. While recognising the benefits of investment and expertise, the ACM also flags risks linked to short-term strategies and consolidation (‘buy-and-build’), particularly in sensitive sectors such as healthcare. Targeted safeguards – such as transparency requirements or protections for professional independence – may be considered.
- ACM’s views on EU merger control policies
The ACM is actively contributing to the debate on reforming EU merger policy. It advocates a broader assessment framework that incorporates sustainability, media pluralism and resilience. At the same time, it calls for clearer guidance on buyer power, earlier use of economic tools such as merger simulations to identify and consider efficiencies, and stronger scrutiny of structural risks, including serial acquisitions and the protection of innovative players in sectors like telecom.
- Investment screening: more filings, limited intervention
Investment screening continues to grow in importance, with an increasing number of filings before the Dutch Bureau of Investment Screening (BTI). However, outcomes remain consistent: almost all transactions are approved, and intervention is still very rare. The parallel review of transactions such as Kyndryl/Solvinity highlights the complementary roles of competition and investment screening regimes in addressing different types of risks.
Private enforcement
As opposed to public enforcement, private enforcement in the Netherlands continues to gain momentum. In 2025, courts saw more cases, more appeals, and a growing number of claims. A wide range of follow-on cartel damages cases (>10) remains pending, alongside an increasing number of abuse of dominance claims, especially in digital markets.
- Jurisdiction remains a battleground
Jurisdiction continues to be heavily contested, especially in cross-border cases. Dutch courts are at the forefront of developments, including on economic unit liability and the use of anchor defendants (read our prior blog on this topic). A landmark development is the Apple App Store ruling, where the CJEU confirmed that collective claims can be centralised in one forum if damage occurs across a national market (read our prior blog on this topic). Upcoming guidance from the CJEU is expected to further clarify the limits of jurisdictional strategies in cartel cases (including in Power Cables and Cardboard Packaging on 16 April 2026).
- Rise of dominance-based claims
Alongside traditional cartel litigation, abuse of dominance claims are becoming more prominent. Cases against Google (Shopping and AdTech) illustrate the increasing complexity and economic depth of such claims, particularly in defining counterfactual scenarios and assessing damages. Recent judgments, such as MTB/Heineken, confirm Dutch courts’ willingness to engage with detailed economic theories of harm, while also carefully scrutinising causation and quantification.
- Key judgments shaping the landscape
Dutch courts continue to deliver important procedural and substantive rulings.
In Booking.com, the District Court adopted a notably independent approach. While treating decisions of the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office (FCO)) as confirmed by German courts as prima facie evidence, it, in remarkable turn of events, questioned the FCO’s market definition, appointed an expert to investigate this matter, and allowed further evidence on the effects of parity clauses. It also revisited earlier rulings on limitation and the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER), showing its willingness to reassess key elements of the case.
In Egg producers, the District Court prioritised procedural efficiency, allowing the case to proceed despite ongoing appeals, while setting strict requirements for claim assignments and claimant identification.
In Wolfson Capital/Google (Google Shopping), in a notable decision, the District Court held that damages must be based on a counterfactual where both elements of the abuse in question are removed (no self-preferencing and no demotion of rivals), potentially increasing recoverable damages for the claimant.
- Collective actions gain traction under WAMCA
Collective actions under the Dutch Act on the Resolution of Mass Damages in Collective Action (WAMCA) regime continue to expand, particularly against large tech companies. New competition law cases in 2025 include claims against Sony (PlayStation Store), Mastercard and Visa (interchange fees), and Booking.com (price parity clauses and dark patterns). At the same time, courts remain strict on admissibility requirements. Cases such as Airbus and X Corp (Twitter) show that insufficient representativity or governance structures can still lead to dismissal at an early stage. Overall, while WAMCA actions are gaining traction, important hurdles remain – particularly around admissibility, similarity of claims and governance.
- Looking ahead: private enforcement
Private enforcement in the Netherlands is expected to continue growing in both volume and sophistication. Key procedural and substantive questions – on jurisdiction, evidence and damages – are gradually being clarified, often with guidance from EU courts. Clear trends include the rise of dominance-based claims, the continued importance of collective actions, and the use of assignment structures to bundle claims. While litigation under the DMA has not yet materialised, the Netherlands remains well positioned as a forum for future digital cases, particularly given its strong procedural toolkit and experience with complex, cross-border disputes.
Should you be interested in receiving a copy of our slides, please reach out to Ruben, Mattijs or Philine:
- Ruben Elkerbout (Partner): relkerbout@geradinpartners.com
- Mattijs Baneke (Counsel): mbaneke@geradinpartners.com
- Philine Wassenaar (Associate): pwassenaar@geradinpartners.com
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