Introduction
In two significant cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Advocate General Emiliou (the AG) delivered his eagerly awaited opinions in RCC Sports v FIFA (C-209/23) and ROGON v German Football Association (C-428/23) on 15 May 2025. The same day, the AG also published his opinion in the case Tondela and others v Autoridade da Concorrencia (C-133/24), concerning the legality of non-poaching agreements between football clubs. Together, these cases formed a trifecta of opinions for football and competition law fans. The former two opinions, which will take centre stage in this blog post, represent a pivotal development in the ongoing legal saga surrounding FIFA’s Football Agent Regulations (FFAR). This blog will first delve into the background of these two cases and the legal challenges that ensued following the FFAR’s implementation in 2023, followed by a summary of the AG’s most important considerations with regard to Article 101(1) and key takeaways.
- What are the FFAR?
The FFAR, implemented in January 2023, represent FIFA’s comprehensive effort to reform regulation for player agents in football with the overarching goal of enhancing fairness and transparency within the transfer market. The FFAR had multiple objectives:
- Elevating professional and ethical standards for agents;
- Limiting conflicts of interest;
- Improving financial transparency;
- Enhancing contractual stability between all parties;
- Preventing abusive or speculative practices in the industry.
To achieve these aims, FIFA introduced – among other things – mandatory licensing requirements for agents, restrictions on multiple representation scenarios, and established caps on agent fees as a percentage of transfer values or player remuneration.
This regulatory approach marks FIFA’s return to direct agent regulation after a period of deregulation that began in 2015 through the introduction of the FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries (FRWI). The FRWI superseded the FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations (FPAR) and led to the abandonment of – among others – the licensing system that the FPAR had imposed on agents. Therefore, the introduction of the FFAR completed a full cycle of regulation, deregulation, and re-regulation of football agents’ activities.
It’s worth noting that the cases currently pending before the CJEU are not the first to assess the legality of FIFA regulations regarding agents’ activities. In the Piau v Commission case before the General Court (T-193/02) in 2002, the General Court concluded that the then-applicable regulations did not constitute an abuse of dominance, and that the restrictions imposed on agents’ activities could be justified, as they improved professionalism and ethical standards in the industry.
- Widespread Criticism of the FFAR throughout Europe
Although FIFA positioned the introduction of the FFAR as an essential component for modernizing football’s regulatory framework and ensuring the smooth functioning of transfers, football agents (and associations representing agents) throughout Europe initiated a barrage of legal proceedings to prevent implementation of the FFAR and its national equivalents (NFAR). In particular, they criticized the legality of the mandatory licensing system (Article 4-9 FFAR), the fee cap on the service fees of agents (Article 15 FFAR), and the ban on multiple representation (Article 12 FFAR), claiming that these provisions violated both Articles 101(1) and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Germany led the charge through court actions in Mainz and Dortmund, with the former resulting in the RCC Sports preliminary reference. The Dortmund court issued an injunction blocking the implementation of the FFAR pending the Mainz preliminary reference. Similar challenges emerged in among others England (through the Football Association (FA) Rule K arbitration), Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic. These cases resulted in a plethora of inconsistent judgments and arbitral awards on the legality of the FFAR. For example:
- A UK tribunal found that certain provisions of the FFAR were in breach of UK competition law;
- The Madrid Commercial Court specifically blocked the fee cap provisions, considering them to be a ‘by object’ restriction;
- In the Netherlands, the Central Netherlands District Court did not grant the injunction to stay the implementation of the Dutch equivalent of the FFAR.
- The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) rendered an award in FIFA’s favour globally, among others confirming the legitimacy of FIFA to regulate agents’ activities, and considered inter alia that the criticised provisions of the FFAR did not qualify as an object restriction under Article 101(1) TFEU.
The mounting legal pressure and inconsistent judgments and arbitral awards basically forced FIFA to suspend implementation of key FFAR provisions for “any transfer with a link to the European Union” in December 2023. FIFA later extended this suspension worldwide to prevent uneven application pending the CJEU’s final decision.
In light of the myriad legal proceedings unfolding in Europe throughout 2023 and 2024, the opinions of the AG in the RCC Sports case and the ROGON case were long awaited. The AG’s opinions also join the ever-growing body of AG opinions and case law on the topic of sports and competition law.
Given that FIFA has been significantly scrutinized in several European judgments on how it regulates certain elements of the football landscape (see Superleague, Royal Antwerp and FIFA cases), certain critics expected the AG to be equally critical of the FFAR’s legality. However, the AG issued an opinion which can be considered to be in favour of the FFAR, which will be summarised below.
Summary of the AG’s Opinions and Key Takeaways
In summary, the RCC Sports case analyses specific elements of the FFAR, including the agent fee structure and licensing system. Meanwhile, the ROGON case addresses the broader authority of football associations to regulate agent activities and the application of the Meca-Medina legal framework to the FFAR. Both opinions deliver a notable, yet preliminary victory for FIFA in its effort to implement stricter agent regulations.
- On Agent Fee Caps
In the RCC Sports case, the AG does not consider the agent fee caps as a restriction by object under Article 101(1) TFEU, noting several important features:
- They do not establish fixed or minimum prices;
- They likely lower rather than raise prices for consumers;
- They maintain transparency without undermining individual market negotiations;
- They simply require that compensation be linked to a percentage of transfer costs or player salary.
The AG, following previous case law in Budapest Bank and Super Bock, rightly points out that a case-specific assessment of an agreement in the light of its content, legal and economic context and objectives is necessary for it to be classified in the object box. Hence, even if certain behaviour seems to have certain elements of an obvious restriction on a given market, this does not entail that it is in fact an object restriction.
Here, the AG separates the fees caps from a buyer cartel by pointing towards the differences between typical buyer’s cartels and the situation at hand. It remains to be seen whether the CJEU will follow this conclusion, but this can undoubtedly be regarded as an important goal for FIFA.
According to the AG, even if anticompetitive effects are identified, these rules may still be justified under the Meca-Medina case law, as sports federations may have the right to regulate agent activities when pursuing objectives of general interest.
- On Meca-Medina Case Law Application
In a similar vein, the AG also expands on the applicability of the Meca-Medina case law to the regulatory powers of sports federations. In that regard, it is important to note that the Meca-Medina case law would only apply in situations where the restriction at issue is not considered a ‘by object’ restriction. In particular, the AG recognises several legitimate objectives for sports regulation that could fall under the Meca-Medina case law:
- Protecting athletes’ health;
- Preventing unfair or fraudulent practices;
- Protecting youth players;
- Safeguarding the principles in Article 165 TFEU.
Importantly, the AG emphasises that economic interests alone cannot justify restrictions on competition; there must be a non-economic general interest involved. The necessity of the rules to safeguard the general interest must also be considered. If the rules cannot be justified based on Meca-Medina case law, the referring court must determine whether they fall under the efficiency defence of Article 101(3) TFEU.
- On Licensing Rules
Regarding the licensing system imposed by the FFAR, the AG considers that such restrictions are similarly not a restriction by object, emphasising that licensing systems are typically designed to address market failures and protect consumers. Citing among others the Superleague and Piau cases, the AG states that the assessment of the anti-competitive effects of such a licensing system depends on whether it is necessary for the profession, proportional to protect legitimate interests, and open, transparent, and non-discriminatory. The AG states that it would be up to the referring court to determine whether the licensing rules would be justified under the Meca-Medina case law, should it come to the same conclusion that the licensing rules do not qualify as an object restriction..
The AG also considers the General Court’s findings in the Piau v Commission case relevant to the present situation, where the General Court ruled that competition was not eliminated by the licensing system because it provided a mechanism that raised professional standards.
- On Multiple Representation
In a similar line of reasoning, the AG also considers the rules preventing multiple representation as pro-competitive, identifying that they are intended to avoid conflicts of interest rather than to restrict competition, and are likely justified under Meca-Medina or exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU. That being said, the AG emphasizes that it is up to the referring court to determine whether less restrictive alternatives exist.
- On Sports Federations’ Regulatory Authority
More significantly, in a very helpful exposé on the Meca-Medina case law, the AG recognises in ROGON that sports federations through self-regulation may have legitimate authority to regulate economic activities connected to those falling squarely within the scope of their core mission and public interests, especially in markets that are interdependent and where collaboration is essential for the ‘end product’.
In particular, the AG acknowledges that there is a football ecosystem comprising of various categories of economic operators and that sports associations can regulate related economic activities (in this case, agents), provided these regulations pursue legitimate objectives of general interest. This is a particularly important element of the opinion, because many critics of FFAR argued that it clearly went beyond the regulatory powers of FIFA to directly regulate the activities of agents.
It is within the context of this authority to regulate such connected activities that the AG emphasises the importance of stakeholder involvement in the drafting and governance process as well as the impact of regulations in question on the third parties’ economic activity. According to the AG, the more stakeholders are affected by regulations in question, the more crucial their contribution becomes to the drafting process, hence facilitating transparency and enhancing the necessity, proportionality, and legitimacy of the rules in question.
Therefore, while creating discretion for sports federations to regulate activities connected to their so-called core mission, the AG nonetheless emphasises the importance of stakeholder involvement. This line of reasoning is very much in line with the CJEU’s Superleague judgment, whereby the CJEU recognized FIFA’s right to regulate prior approval and participation in competitions, but must do so in a clear, transparent, objective, and proportionate way. Therefore, governance and transparency remain an important guiding principle for sports associations.
- On Individual Rule Assessment
The AG also clarifies in ROGON that each individual rule in a sports federation’s regulations must be separately assessed against the Meca-Medina case law, rather than evaluating the regulations as a whole, drawing on the fact that different rules may affect various markets and different types of businesses in distinct ways.
Key Takeaways
There are several important takeaways that can be drawn from the opinions of the AG. First, the AG’s approach validates FIFA’s wiggle room to regulate the football ecosystem as well its stated objectives for the FFAR, which include enhancing transparency and ethics in agent activities. Secondly, the emphasis on stakeholder involvement reinforces a growing trend in sports governance that values inclusive and transparent decision-making processes. This may encourage sports federations to adopt more collaborative approaches to regulation. Thirdly, while the questions referred to the CJEU concern European law, the opinions (and ultimately the judgment that will be issued in several months’ time) will also influence the global applicability of the FFAR, given its supranational nature.
The question that remains is whether the CJEU will follow AG Emiliou’s reasoning in its judgments, which are expected in August or September of this year. If that is the case, it would represent a significant endorsement of FIFA’s regulatory approach concerning the regulation of agents’ activities, as well as most likely leading to the revival of the suspended FFAR provisions. However, as we’ve seen in cases like Superleague, the CJEU doesn’t always follow the AG’s conclusions, so this ongoing match is far from over yet.
Disclaimer: The authors represent the Royal Dutch Football Association in the FFAR proceedings in the Netherlands. The views expressed in this blog are those of the authors and cannot be attributed to the Royal Dutch Football Association.
